digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2010

Delphic Dictum: How Has the ICJ Contributed to
the Global Rule of Law by Its Ruling on Kovoso
Kosovo in the ICJ - The Case
Robert Howse
robert.howse@nyls.edu

Ruti Teitel
New York Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
11 German L.J. 841 (2010)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Delphic Dictum: How Has the ICJ Contributed to the Global
Rule of Law by its Ruling on Kosovo?

By Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel*

The most immediately striking aspect of the ICJ's recent ruling on Kosovo's unilateral
declaration of independence is the divergence between what the Court actually said and
how its decision is being read in the media and by political actors. Typically the Court is
said to have found secession by Kosovo to be 11 legal" or 11 lawful" under international law.
According to Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu, 11 The decision finally removes all doubts that
countries which still do not recognize the Republic of Kosovo could have." The angry
reaction to the decision by Serbian nationalists likewise supposed that the Court had
endorsed a right to secession. In fact, what the Court did was to read literally-and some
would say narrowly or pedantically-the question it was asked, and thus to avoid opining
on the major legal (and related policy) issues raised by the act of secession, including
whether there is a right to proceed with a unilateral act of secession, and to whom such a
right may or may not belong. On the literal reading, the Court was not asked, and thus it
did not rule on, whether international law requires that the final status of Kosovo protect
the group and individual rights of minorities, whether Kosovar Serbs or Roma. Likewise, the
Court did not rule on whether Serbia or, indeed, any other State in the world community is
required to recognize Kosovo as an independent State. Nor did the Court's decision
address the borders of an independent Kosovo, or whether and under what circumstances
force could legally be used either to impose independence or to resist it.
The question posed to the Court by the General Assembly was as follows: 11 ls the unilateral
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
in accordance with international law?" A contextual and certainly a purpose-driven
reading of this question might well have led the Court to interpret it as asking whether the
result or course of action implied by the declaration was in accordance with international
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law. Indeed, the written submissions of a number of States before the Court, and the
range of issues that they addressed, contemplated or urged such a possible meaning to the
question. Instead, the Court considered that the sole measure that it was required to
address was the declaratory act itself.
Now one could argue that there are cases where mere words may constitute or contribute
to an internationally wrongful act-incitement to genocide, for instance, or a threat of the
use of force. Thus, a declaration of independence that was understood as an incitement to
genocide or where such conduct could be foreseen as a direct consequence of such a
declaration, could be considered an internationally wrongful act. Perhaps, then, the Court
moved a little too fast in suggesting (at paragraph 50) that a question about the legality of
a declaration of independence need not entail any consideration whatever of the legality
of its consequences. Indeed, later in its opinion the Court noted that the Security Council
had condemned certain declarations of independence because "they were, or would have
been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of
general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character Uus cogens)."
The Court, in our view, was probably right to find that there is no general prohibition in
international law of declarations of independence, i.e. unless they can be connected to
violations of other norms of international law. But how could the Court be so sure that the
Kosovo declaration was not or would not be connected to such violations of other norms?
The answer is by "reading down" or reducing the declaration to a statement of hopes and
wishes, mere words without obvious effects. So, while the declaration itself says that
Kosovo is declared "to be an independent and sovereign state" and that "Kosovo shall be
legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in this declaration" (emphases
added), the Court does not consider the declaration as an act of secession. Thus, it can
interpret the question before it as not asking "whether or not Kosovo has achieved
statehood .... [n]or ... about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those
States which have recognized it as an independent State." From this perspective, there is
nothing in the Court's opinion that in any way contradicts the decision of the Republic of
Serbia in 2008 that the declaration "did not produce legal effects either in Serbia or in the
international legal order" (this language is the Court's - from paragraph 76 of the opinion paraphrase of the Serbian decision). Moreover, there is nothing in the Court's decision
that would place any constraint on a competing declaration of independence of Kosovar
Serbs, which would be one route towards the partition of Kosovo. (As we shall now go on
to discuss, since the majority of the Court did not consider the declaration an official act of
the authorities in Kosovo, it could not be considered to legally preclude such a declaration
by Kosovar Serbs).
Further reinforcing the reduction of the Declaration to mere words-such that the Court
was not called on to consider the legality of an act of secession-is the Court's interesting
holding (from which there are also interesting dissents) that, in making the declaration, the
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agents in question were not acting in their capacity as officials of the Kosovo
administration but rather "in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo
outside the framework of the interim administration." (paragraph 109). According to the
Court, "the authors of that declaration did not act, or intend to act, in the capacity of an
institution created by and empowered to act within that legal order but, rather, set out to
adopt a measure the significance and effects of which would lie outside that order."
(paragraph 105). The implication is clear: the declaration is to be read as having no legal
or administrative effect within the existing framework of government in Kosovo. Indeed, it
has no legal meaning as long as this framework exists. The intent or wish stated in the
declaration concerning the nature of the final political settlement for Kosovo does not
contradict the Security Council's approach, which has not excluded independence as one
option for a final settlement. At the same time, the declaration as read by the Court does
not unilaterally impose, much less immediately, a legally-valid final settlement in the form
of independence. Instead it expresses the desire for such a final settlement. (Judge
Koroma, in his dissenting opinion, evaluates the declaration based on the view, contrary to
the majority finding just described, that it has to be considered as a purported official act
of an organ of the provisional institutions of government in Kosovo. Viewed in this way,
Judge Koroma makes a plausible case that the declaration violates various provisions of the
Security Council framework embodied in resolution 1244 (1999). Judge Bennouna's
dissent also takes issue with the majority's refusal to consider the declaration to be an
official act of the provisional authorities in Kosovo.).
The majority's position that the declaration is not an act of secession itself, and indeed that
it is not at all an official act of a governing authority, actually raises an interesting question
concerning the situation of those States that have already recognized Kosovo's
independence based on the declaration. If the declaration is what the majority says it is,
can it be on its own an adequate basis for recognition of statehood?
This leads us to the Court's thinly veiled skepticism as to whether a general unilateral right
to secession exists in international law, a question previously considered by the Canadian
Supreme Court in the Quebec Secession Reference and answered in the negative (though
the Canadian Court was open to the possibility that secession might be justified under
international law where it is the only available remedy to oppression). The ICJ noted:
"Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determination
confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from that State,
is , ... , a subject on which radically different views were expressed by those taking part in
the proceedings and expressing a position on the question. Similar differences existed
regarding whether international law provides for a right of 'remedial secession' and, if so,
in what circumstances." (paragraph 82). By acknowledging the range and intensity of
disagreement among States on a right to secede, the Court seems to have hinted that the
necessary consent of the world community does not exist to establish firmly the existence
of any such right as a matter of international law at this time.
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Here we need to consider Judge Simma's separate declaration, which takes issue in strong
terms with the narrow manner in which the majority understood its mandate. First of all,
Judge Simma notes that, in reading "in accordance with international law" as meaning
exclusively whether the declaration violates any prohibitive rule, the majority adopted an
"anachronistic, extremely consensualist view of international law." (paragraph 3). As we
have argued in recent work, the mere constraint of State behavior by rules does not
capture many of the ways that international law provides normative guidance or direction
1
to global politics.
But the ICJ as currently structured may not be well-situated to
transcend fully the "anachronistic, extremely consensualist vision" that is really Statecentric or -centered because the ICJ as an institution is in many ways a reflection of just
that vision. The tension is increasingly apparent as more and more of the controversies
that the Court is called upon to decide, have posed challenges to adherence to that simple
2
view, whether on nuclear weapons, the security fence between Israel and the
3
Territories, or violent conflict implicating non-state actors (Armed Activities in the
4
Congo). Ultimately, the question posed to the Court in this case was the product of
political and diplomatic negotiation among State representatives; although the authors of
the declaration of independence filed a statement with the Court, the pleadings and, thus,
the shape of the arguments otherwise were completely dominated by States. National
minorities or individuals whose rights and interests are very much at stake had no standing
before the ICJ. Consider the contrast with the Canadian Supreme Court. In ruling on the
question of secession, albeit under Canadian constitutional law (its ruling under
international law is discussed above), the federal Government of Canada invited the Court
to take a very narrow view of the question before it: all the Court needed to do was to
conclude that the formal amendment procedure in the Canadian constitution did not
provide for secession. But the Canadian Court went beyond this narrow approach and
examined the relevant principles underlying the Canadian constitutional order that might
5
guide secession, including democracy, federalism, minority rights, and the rule of law.
But the reference to the Canadian Court, while based on questions posed by the Canadian
government, actually began as a challenge to the legality of secession raised by Guy
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Betrand, a private citizen in Quebec. By making a reference to the Court, the Canadian
federal government of the day actually pre-empted Mr. Betrand's claim. But, as an
intervener, he was able to plead his case before the Court, as were aboriginal groups and
other affected non-state actors.
The international legal order as it has "evolved" in Bruno Simma's words, "into its present
form" cannot fully be taken into account by the ICJ because this evolution reflects a new
subjectivity, driven by the claims of persons and peoples and their recognition as
6
autonomous actors in the international legal system that is no way reflected in the ICJ's
State-centrism. The narrowness of the Court's ruling on Kosovo, regrettable against an
ideal conception of what a truly global court could and should do, may at the same time
create the space for other judicial institutions that are open to the claims of persons and
peoples, ultimately to provide meaningful normative guidance on the difficult legal issues
raised by secession-for example, perhaps eventually, the European Court of Human
Rights. The international legal system remains decentralized with multiple sites of
interpretation and a more fluid relationship to politics than that suggested by the image of
7
a world court as a final "constitutional" authority on legal normativity.
Given the
challenge of difference and diversity at a global level, and the legitimacy questions posed
8
by governance distanced if not detached from classic forms of democratic accountability,
9
there is wisdom in a world court that eschews the aspiration to interpretive hegemony.
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